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Civil Procedure
By JOHN H. GARvEY* AND BiL DoRRIs**
I. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In Commonwealth v. All Points Construction Company,'
the Home Insurance Company filed a claim for contribution
against the Commonwealth with the Board of Claims in August
1976. The insurance company had settled personal injury and
wrongful death claims on behalf of its insured on March 1,
1976. The claims arose from an automobile accident which had
occurred in September 1974. The Commonwealth argued that
a claim for contribution accrues at the time of the acci-
dent-rather than upon payment-for purposes of Kentucky
Revised Statutes § 44.110,2 which provides that all claims
against the Commonwealth must be filed with the Board
within one year from the time they accrue. The Court of Ap-
peals disagreed.
Claims for contribution based on tort are generally held to
accrue at the time of payment.3 Such an approach makes it
more difficult for one who is sued for contribution, but who is
not sued by the injured party in any primary action, to investi-
gate and prepare a defense based on the transaction which gave
rise to joint liability. To that extent one purpose of statutes of
limitations-to guard against entertaining claims based on
stale evidence-is frustrated. But the party whose action is
begun after the expiration of the statute is at least able to
benefit from the discovery, and often proof, made by the partic-
ipants in the primary action. In any event, permitting the stat-
ute to run from the time of the accident would often result in
foreclosure of the tortfeasor's contribution claim, since the con-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. A.B. 1970, University of
Notre Dame; J.D. 1974, Harvard University.
** J.D. 1979, University of Kentucky.
1 566 S.W.2d 171 (Ky. App. 1977).
2 Ky. REv. STAT. § 44.110 (1972) (hereinafter cited as KRS) states: "A claim must
be presented to the board within one (1) year from the time it has accrued."
Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Burge, 54 S.W.2d 16 (Ky. 1932); City of Louisville
v. O'Donaghue, 162 S.W. 1110 (Ky. 1914). See generally ANNOr., 57 A.L.R.3d 867,875-
80 (1974). See also RESTATEMENT OF RESTnrrION, § 82 (1936).
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tribution claim cannot be brought until after the injured party
decides to proceed.4
The Commonwealth based its argument on Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Commonwealth,5 which held that an insurer
who had settled a wrongful death claim on behalf of its insured
tortfeasor could maintain an action in the Board of Claims
against the Commonwealth for contribution. The thrust of the
Commonwealth's argument in Automobile Insurance was that
the insurer was not a "person" within the meaning of the stat-
ute6 authorizing the Board of Claims to compensate persons for
damages sustained as a proximate result of the Common-
wealth's negligence. The Court reasoned that because the in-
surer was subrogated to the rights of its insured after paying
the claim, it stood in the same position as its insured would
have if he had settled the claim and then asked for contribu-
tion. The Commonwealth's positon in All Points seemed to rest
on the misapprehension that the insurer was subrogated to the
rights of the injured party.
The Court of Appeals suggested in dictum that when an
insurer makes payment to its insured for a loss caused by a
third-party tortfeasor, the insurer has only one year from the
date of the accident or injury to bring the claim before the
Board. 7 This is consistent with the thought that the insurer
stands in the same position as its insured, whose claim accrued
at the time of the accident. However, this view appears to be a
significant departure from the law of several other jurisdic-
tions.'
I Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Burge, 54 S.W.2d 16 (Ky. 1932); Roehrig v. City
of Louisville, 454 S.W.2d 703 (Ky. 1970) (dictum). Cf. Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d
586 (Ky. 1967) (adjudication of liability for contribution, as distinguished from a right
to contribution, can be made before the right to recover contribution has fully matured
through payment).
5 414 S.W.2d 578 (Ky. 1967).
6 KRS § 44.070(1) (1972).
7 566 S.W.2d at 173.
1 E.g., Chicago & N.W. R. Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R. Co., 179 F.
Supp. 33 (N.D. Iowa 1959), affl'd, 280 F.2d 110 (8th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
931 (1961). See generally ANNO'r., 57 A.L.R.3d 867, 885-90 (1974).
The Court had held in Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Brown Wood Preserv-
ing Co., 182 S.W.2d 30 (Ky. 1944), that since the Workmen's Compensation Act did
not create a new right of action against a third party who injured the employee by an
insurer who was obligated to compensate the employee, the applicable statute of
limitations was that governing the right of action of the injured employee against the
[Vol. 67
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H. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
In Tube Turns Division of Chemetron Corp. v. Patterson
Co., Inc.9 suit was brought by Tube Turns against a Colorado
corporation in state court for $9,608.80 alleged to be due under
a contract. Tube Turns initiated the contact with Patterson in
Colorado, offering to sell it bellows expansion joints. Patterson
subsequently negotiated from Colorado by mail and telephone
with Tube Turns' Louisville office. These negotiations culmi-
nated in Tube Turns' acceptance in Louisville of a single order
placed by Patterson. Evidently, the negotiations and contract
were the only contacts Patterson had with Kentucky."0 Patter-
son was served under Kentucky's long arm statute and its mo-
tion to quash service of process was granted. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision and rendered an
opinion which contained the first interpretation by a Kentucky
appellate court of KRS § 454.210 (2)(a)(1), the "transacting
any business" subsection of the long-arm statute."1
The Sixth Circuit, in Davis H. Elliot Co. v. Caribbean
Utilities Co., 2 had previously interpreted that subsection as
extending to the limits of due process, a reading which has been
praised as effectuating the intention of the General Assembly
while avoiding the difficult problem of defining what
tortfeasor. The dictum in All Points seems to be the first indication that the courts
will apply this holding to situations not involving the Workmen's Compensation Act.
562 S.W.2d 99 (Ky. App. 1978).
The Court of Appeals went to great lengths to make this point:
Patterson has no certificate of authority to transact business in Ken-
tucky. It has never maintained an office, a post office box, or telephone
directory listing for the purpose of transacting business in Kentucky. Patter-
son has no employees or agents in Kentucky, and it owns no property in
Kentucky. Its employees and agents never physically entered Kentucky for
the purpose of negotiating contracts or soliciting any business.
The record does not indicate that the bellows expansion joints were
specially manufactured for Patterson. In fact, the record does not even indi-
cate that the goods were manufactured in Kentucky.
562 S.W.2d at 99-100.
, KRS § 454.210 (Supp. 1978):
(1) As used in this section, "person" includes . . . a corporation ...
who is a nonresident of this Commonwealth.
(2)(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts
directly or by an agent, as to a claim arising from the person's:
1. Transacting any business in the Commonwealth. ...
12 513 F.2d 1176 (6th Cir. 1975).
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"transacting any business" means apart from the requirements
of due process. 3 The Court of Appeals, though not bound by
the Sixth Circuit's interpretation, adopted the Caribbean
Utilities interpretation of "transacting any business,"" and
concluded that assuming jurisdiction over Patterson would vio-
late the due process clause as well as the long-arm statute.,5
The court employed the tripartite due process analysis
used by the Sixth Circuit in Southern Machine Co. v. Mohasco
Indus., Inc. :1" i.e., to justify personal jurisdiction over a nonres-
ident on the basis of an isolated business transaction, (1) the
defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of
acting or causing a consequence in the forum state;" (2) the
cause of action must arise from the defendant's activities in the
forum state;9 and, (3) the acts of the defendant must have
sufficient connection with the forum state to make the exercise
of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable. 9 Yet, the court's
application of this analysis in Tube Turns was so cursory that
it is difficult to determine which of the criteria the court found
decisive. At the close of its opinion the court stated:
In the absence of proof that Patterson should have
anticipated that its order with Tube Turns could have a sub-
stantial impact on commerce within Kentucky, it would be
'3 L'ENFANT, Civil Procedure, Kentucky Law Survey, 64 Ky. L. J. 357, 360-61
(1975-76).
, 562 S.W.2d at 100.
" Ordinarily, questions of in personam jurisdiction involve a two-step inquiry: (1)
Did the state legislature authorize the courts to exercise jurisdiction under the facts
of the particular case?, and (2) Does the exercise of jurisdiction violate due process?
However, these steps are merged where the state legislature has authorized the courts
to exercise the fullest jurisdiction permitted by the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. See Davis H. Elliot Co. v. Caribbean Utilities Co., 513 F.2d 1176,
1179 (6th Cir. 1975).
I 401 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1968). See note 29 infra for a discussion of the utility of
adopting this approach.
"1 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
,s Where the defendant's connections with the state are more substantial, this
requirement may not apply. See Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437
(1952). Nevertheless, this limitation is expressly made applicable in Kentucky by KRS
§ 454.210(b) (Supp. 1978): "When jurisdiction over a person is based solely on this
section, only a claim arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted
against him."
11 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
[Vol. 67
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unreasonable and a denial of due process to require Patterson
to defend this action in the Kentucky Courts.2
The decisive effect of the unforseeability of Patterson's actions
seems to implicate the "purposeful activity" requirement of
the Southern Machine approach, but in a manner inconsistent
with the Sixth Circuit's own understanding of the Southern
Machine test. In In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air,
Inc.21 the Sixth Circuit stated that the purposeful action test
was merely a "baseline requirement"22 which:
seeks to avoid the assertion of jurisdiction in a situation
where all contacts result entirely from a decision made by
plaintiff as was the case in Hanson v. Denckla. Certainly the
intentional entering into a contractual relationship with a
resident of the forum state is sufficient to protect against the
Hanson v. Denckla problem and so to meet the purposeful
action requirement.?
There can be little doubt that Patterson's placing a single order
with Tube Turns would satisfy such an interpretation of the
first requirement of the Southern Machine approach. More-
over, the Sixth Circuit commented in In-Flight that the third
part of the Southern Machine approach, which requires an
investigation of the general fairness of the assertion of jurisdic-
tion, would be decisive in a case like Tube Turns.u In fact, a
close reading of the Tube Turns opinion indicates that the
decision may well have hinged on the absence of the third
factor.
Three aspects of the opinion support this conclusion. First,
immediately after stating the Southern Machine test, the court
declared that:
" 562 S.W.2d at 101 (emphasis added).
21 466 F.2d 220, 227 (6th Cir. 1972).
22 Id. at 228.
2 Id.
" The Sixth Circuit wrote:
The third part of the Southern Machine approach requires an investigation
of the general fairness of the assertion of jurisdiction-and it is at this stage
that the consumer-and perhaps the small businessman engaged in intra-
state activities can expect to be protected against improper use of the
longarm power.
Id. at 227, n. 13.
1978-79]
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Applying these criteria to the facts of this case, we conclude
that it would be unreasonable for Kentucky to exercise juris-
diction over Patterson solely on the basis of negotiations by
telephone and mail which culminated in the acceptance of a
single order in Louisville.2s
Second, the court noted in great detail that many of the
indicators of a strong forum state interest in deciding the con-
troversy were lacking in Tube Turns.2 Though the court did
not expressly find Kentucky's forum interests inadequate, its
.extensive discussion of interests is indicative of the court's ov-
erriding concern with the fairness and reasonableness of juris-
diction.
Finally, the crucial nature of the third requirement is dem-
onstrated by the court's attempt to distinguish between non-
resident sellers and nonresident buyers: "Unlike the nonresi-
dent seller who seeks to distribute its products within the
forum state, the nonresident buyer enjoys no particular privi-
lege or protection in purchasing products from a resident
seller."" However, this distinction is more apparent than real.28
.It is fairly clear that a nonresident buyer benefits from Ken-
tucky law governing contract formation, the method of produc-
tion, definition of breach, and method of payment in much the
same way as a seller, and enjoys the incidental assistance
which the seller's home state provides to all commercial trans-
actions in the form of police and fire protection, highways,
utilities regulation, and so on. If there is any sense in the
21 562 S.W.2d at 100 (emphasis added). For an indication of the importance of a
strong state interest to a fair and reasonable basis for jurisdiction see Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220
(1957); In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 446 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1972).
" The court stated:
The record in this case does not indicate that the goods were specially manu-
factured or fabricated. Patterson's order with Tube Turns was not part of a
series of transactions, and the record does not indicate that it was a particu-
larly large order. There was no inspection of production facilities following
substantial negotiations.
562 S.W.2d at 100.
' 562 S.W.2d at 100. See also In-Flight Services Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air,
Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 232 (6th Cir. 1972); Oswalt Indus., Inc. v. Gilmore, 297 F. Supp.
307, 312 (D. Kan. 1969); Fourth Northwestern Bank of Minneapolis v. Hilson Indus.,
Inc., 117 N.W.2d 732 (Minn. 1962).
nSee CumIE, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction
in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 576.
[Vol. 67
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buyer/seller distinction, it is rather that it operates as a shib-
boleth for recognizing a state of facts which may bear on fair-
ness to the defendant.
To take an extreme case, consider the assertion of personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident mail-order buyer by the seller's
home state. What makes that claim of jurisdiction unaccepta-
ble is in fact a combination of factors, none of which is neces-
sarily keyed to the defendant's status as buyer: the likelihood
that the seller took the initiative in soliciting purchases, the
improbability that the defendant carried out in person or
through an agent any negotiations in the forum state, the likely
financial hardship to a small-order buyer who would perhaps
find it cheaper to default than to defend, the unlikelihood that
the buyer does any substantial volume of interstate commerce.
If there is a thread which connects these elements, it is the
defendant's probable expectations-both psychological and
financial-as to a proper forum for dispute resolution, rather
than the fact that the defendant happened to be a purchaser
instead of a seller. Nevertheless, the fact that the court consid-
ered the buyer-seller distinction suggests that it was attempt-
ing to determine whether personal jurisdiction in Tube Turns
satisfied the third requirement of Southern Machine.
The decision in Tube Turns is significant for its accept-
ance of an expansive interpretation of the "transacting any
business" subsection of the long-arm statute. But the court's
application of the due process clause to the facts of the case
before it did little to further the clarity or development of the
law of Kentucky in this important area. 9
1, Professor L'Enfant cautioned that the Sixth Circuit in reality applied a
"commercial impact" test in Southern Machine. L'ENFANT, supra note 13, at 361. Such
a test would unnecessarily narrow the due process test. However, the Kentucky Court
of Appeals in no way utilized a "commerical impact" test. It simply did not base its
decision on the lack of a substantial commerical impact.
The three-factor approach of Southern Machine has also been criticized as an
unnecessary narrowing of the due process test because jurisdiction may exist even
though all three factors are not present. See Comment, Long-Arm and Quasi In Rem
Jurisdiction and the Fundamental Test of Fairness, 69 MicH. L.R. 300,312 (1970). The
only recognized instance of incongruity between due process and the Southern
Machine test occurs where jurisdiction is constitutional despite non-existence of the
second requirement, as in Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
Yet this incongruity is statutorily mandated in Kentucky, since the second require-
ment is a statutory essential to jurisdiction. See note 18 supra for the relevant statute
and a brief exposition of this constraint. Thus the Kentucky statute demands at least
some unnecessary narrowing of the due process test.
1978-79]
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Ill. DISCOVERY
Pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 26.05,30 a
party has an affirmative duty seasonably to supplement re-
sponses to interrogatories addressed to the identity of each per-
son it expects to call as an expert witness at trial, the subject
matter on which he is expected to testify, and the substance of
his testimony. The Court of Appeals, in Hicks v. Cole,3' was
confronted with a situation where the defendant desired to
have an expert's deposition read into evidence, even though the
defendant had not supplemented his responses to such interro-
gatories after responding that he had no plans to use experts
at that time. However, he did give notice that he would take
the deposition of a particular physician.3 2 The plaintiff cross-
examined the defendant's expert at the deposition, while ob-
jecting to the taking of the deposition. At a pretrial hearing,
unattended by the plaintiff, the court overruled his objections
to the taking and use of the deposition. At trial, the deposition
was read into evidence over the plaintiffs objection.
On appeal from a jury verdict for the defendant, the plain-
tiff argued that (1) the taking of the deposition was improper
As long as the court guards against the application of a "commercial impact" test,
the three-factor approach outlined in Southern Machine and adopted in Tube Turns
should provide a useful analytical framework for deciding future cases. This is espe-
cially true in light of the Sixth Circuit's clarification of the Southern Machine ap-
proach:
As must be apparent, this approach simply applies in a specific fashion
the broad rule requiring substantial minimum contacts as a basis for juris-
diction. The first and second elements of the method merely involve a search
for specific types of contacts which have been held to be essential to the
maintenance of jurisdiction in the McGee and Hanson v. Denckla decisions.
It is imperative that it be understood that the flexibility, and therein the
virtue, of the International Shoe test is retained in the third condition and
no mechanical consideration of the first two elements of the test can elimi-
nate the need for an appraisal of the overall circumstances of each case if
jurisdiction is to be found.
In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 226 (6th Cir. 1972).
1 Ky. R. Civ. P. [hereinafter cited as CR] 26.05 states, in part:
A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his response with respect
to any question directly addressed to . .. (ii) the identity of each person
expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the subject matter on
which he is expected to testify, and the substance of his testimony.
" 566 S.W.2d 169 (Ky. App. 1977).
22 CR 30.02 requires that a party give notice to all other parties before taking a
deposition by oral examination.
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since the defendant had not supplemented his answers to the
interrogatories, and (2) the deposition should have been ex-
cluded at trial since the defendant had not supplemented his
answers to the interrogatories. Though the rules do not specifi-
cally authorize the imposition of sanctions for violations of the
duty found in CR 26.05, it is generally assumed that the courts
have the inherent power to impose penalties for noncompli-
ance,rs including the exclusion of evidence. 3'
The Court of Appeals found that the defendant had satis-
fied the purpose and spirit of the rules by giving notice of the
deposition. This procedure had given the plaintiff notice that
the deposition might be used at trial. As a result, the court held
the trial court committed no error in allowing the deposition to
be read into evidence. The soundness of this decision can only
be evaluated in light of the purpose of the rule. The duty sea-
sonably to supplement responses to interrogatories concerning
experts expected to be used at trial exists because of the im-
portance of expert witnesses and the need for discovery if the
testimony of an expert is to be effectively cross-examined or
rebutted.3 5
The court did not fully state or expressly address the plain-
tiff's first argument-that the taking of the deposition was
improper due to the defendant's failure seasonably to supple-
ment the interrogatories. Evidently, the gist of this contention
was that due to the defendant's failure to supplement the
answers the plaintiff was unable to cross-examine the expert
effectively. However, the court found that the rule was not
intended to provide notice which would aid a party in prepar-
ing for a deposition: "This is designed to give the opposing
party the chance to prepare for the trial itself."31 Yet, one of
the purposes of discovering information concerning an oppo-
3 The general rule on sanctions, CR 37, does not apply to the failure to fulfill the
duty to supplement answers to interrogatories. See WiuGHT & MuLER, FEDERAn PRAc-
TICE & PROCEDURE, § 2050.
u See Federal Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e).
The duty (to supplement answers to interrogatories) will normally be en-
forced where it is imposed, through sanctions imposed by the trial courts
including the exclusion of evidence.
See also Davis v. Marathon Oil Co., 528 F.2d 395, 403 (6th Cir. 1975).
35 See Federal Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e).
" 566 S.W.2d at 171.
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nent's expert witnesses and imposing a duty on the opponent
seasonably to supplement its responses is to ensure that the
party has adequate information for use in effectively cross-
examining the expert.37 To the extent that the deposition it-
self is used at trial, a portion of the trial in essence takes place
at the deposition. It would seem that a supplementary answer
needs to be served approximately at the same time as the no-
tice to take the deposition.3 1 Such notice must be given a rea-
sonable time in advance in order to give the other party a
chance to prepare, according to CR 30.03; information concern-
ing an expert seems equally essential to adequate preparation.
However, the court was possibly justified in quickly dis-
posing of plaintiff's first argument. The plaintiff failed to at-
tend the pretrial hearing held to determine the propriety of the
taking of the deposition. Moreover, he probably should have
asked for an order that the interrogatories be answered prior to
the deposition. In addition, since the power to exclude evidence
as a sanction for violation of a discovery rule is part of a trial
court's inherent power,3 9 the court necessarily has wide discre-
tion in use of the sanction. Just because the court has the power
to impose such a sanction does not necessarily mean that it
must. Generally, in fashioning a remedy for failure to supple-
ment answers to interrogatories, the court should consider the
possibility of a continuance, the importance of the testimony
of the witness, the explanation for the failure to supplement
and the need for time to prepare to meet the testimony." By
failing either to seek an advance order or to attend the pretrial
hearing, the plaintiff foreclosed the circuit court from fully
examining these considerations before choosing between exclu-
sion and a less severe remedy, such as a continuance while the
expert was re-deposed. Hence, the decision with regard to the
plaintiff's first argument should have turned on the trial
court's discretion to deny such a harsh remedy, not on a consid-
eration of interrogatories as only a trial preparation device.
17 See note 35, supra.
" CR 26.05 requires the interrogatories to be supplemented "seasonably," while
CR 30.02 requires the notice to be given a "reasonable" time prior to the taking of the
deposition.
31 See note 34 supra for an exposition of authority on this point.
"' WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 33.
[Vol. 67
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With respect to the plaintiffs second argument, the court
held that the purpose and spirit of the rules had been satisfied.
It stated that the defendant had put the plaintiff on notice that
the deposition might be used by following the notice of deposi-
tion procedure. This result certainly vindicates one policy be-
hind CR 26.05, i.e., to provide a party with information about
the other party's experts. However, the Hicks court indicated
in dictum that under the facts of that case the expert would
have been permitted to testify in person:
Had plaintiff's attorneys appeared at this hearing and con-
vinced the trial court that the deposition should not be used
at trial, defendant would still have been able to secure Dr.
Bloss at trial or whatever other testimony was needed by
defendant."1
This suggestion by the court seems to ignore the other
purpose behind discovery of an expert witness-to enable a
party to rebut the expert's testimony more effectively. The
opponent would want to attack the credibility of the deponent
and the substance of what the deponent said by the use of other
witnesses. If the deponent were to testify at trial, it might well
affect the presentation of the opponent's rebuttal evidence. For
example, the opponent may have been planning to use deposi-
tions, rather than live witnesses. In such a case, a continuance
may well be necessary to prevent the unfairness which would
result from such a surprise.
2
IV. PARTIES
A. Right to Sue
KRS § 271A.610 3 provides that no foreign corporation
transacting business in Kentucky without a certificate of au-
thority shall be permitted to maintain an action in any Ken-
tucky court. In Southeastern Skate Supply, Inc. v. Layman,"
"1 566 S.W.2d at 171.
12 See e.g., Washington Hosp. Cntr. v. Cheeks, 394 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(expert allowed to testify after opposing party deposed him).
1 KRS § 271A.610 (Supp. 1978) states:
(1) No foreign corporation transacting business in this state without a certifi-
cate of authority shall be permitted to maintain any action, suit or proceed-
ing in any court of this state, until such corporation shall have obtained a
certificate of authority. ...
" 562 S.W.2d 95 (Ky. App. 1978).
1978-791
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the Court of Appeals reversed a circuit court judgment, based
on KRS § 271A.610, which dismissed a foreign corporation's
complaint. Southeastern Skate Supply, a Virginia corporation,
brought the suit to recover an amount allegedly owed for goods
it had supplied to the defendant. The circuit court dismissed
the complaint, assuming that the plaintiff was transacting
business in the state without a certificate of authority.
The Court of Appeals noted that there was no evidence
showing the corporation did, in fact, transact business in the
state. The only activities in which the plaintiff was apparently
engaged were excluded from the definition of "transacting
business" by KRS § 271A.520.4 As a result, the court reversed
the circuit court order dismissing the suit. The effect of the
decision is to place the burden of proving that a foreign corpo-
ration is doing business without a certificate upon the defen-
dant sued by such a corporation. This approach is consistent
with the purpose of KRS § 271A.610 which, like its progenitor,
Model Business Corporation Act § 124, seeks to ensure protec-
tion of local citizens who deal with or are affected by the activi-
ties of foreign corporations operating within the forum state. 6
A defendant who raises failure to qualify as a defense does not
assert any personal right, but acts as a sort of private attorney
general on behalf of the Commonwealth.47 Since it will most
often be a matter of indifference to the objecting party-at
least prior to the initiation of suit-that the plaintiff has failed
to qualify, there is little unfairness in the allocation of the
burden of proof imposed by the Court of Appeals. Moreover,
the constitutionally based concern for noninterference with in-
" KRS § 271A.520 (Supp. 1978) states:
(2) Without excluding other activities which may not constitute transacting
business in this state, a foreign corporation shall not be considered to be
transacting business in this state, for the purposes of this chapter, by reason
of carrying on in this state any one or more of the following activities:
(i) Transacting any business in interstate commerce;
(j) Conducting an isolated transaction completed within a period of thirty
(30) days and not in the course of a number of repeated transactions of like
nature.
46 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2d §§ 110-12 (hereinafter cited as MBCA ANN.).
" The best evidence of this is that KRS § 271A.610(2) permits qualification after
suit has begun, with no effect on the claim which is the subject of the suit. See MBCA
ANN. § 124.
[Vol. 67
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terstate commerce," recognized by the exemption provided in
KRS § 271A.520, warrants very careful use of an evidentiary
rule which risks penalizing a company whose business is wholly
interstate."
B. Unincorporated Associations
One of the most confused issues in the law dealing with
parties concerns the capacity of unincorporated associations to
act as plaintiffs or defendants." In American Collectors Ex-
change, Inc. v. Kentucky State Democratic Central Executive
Committee" the Court of Appeals attempted to summarize and
apply the Kentucky law on this issue. American Collectors had
appealed the dismissal by the circuit court of two third-party
complaints. The first asked for contribution from the Executive
Committee in its common name. The second, also for contribu-
tion, named as third-party defendants the Executive Commit-
tee and several persons individually and as representatives of
the class composing the Executive Committee.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the first
complaint, relying on the common-law rule that an unincorpor-
ated association can not be sued solely in its own name. 52 The
court held that the circuit court had erred in dismissing the
second complaint, given "a rather curious development" in
Kentucky's case law:
While not subject to suit solely in its own name, it appears
that an unincorporated association may be sued through the
device of a class action. When such a suit is otherwise capable
of being maintained, not only can the members of the class
who compose the association be brought before the court, but
" See MBCA ANN. § 106. See also Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 182-3
(1868).
1' Cf. F. JAMES & G. HA ARD, Com PRoCEDURE 252-53 (2d ed. 1977) for a discussion
of the relationship between burdens of proof and substantive considerations.
" For summaries of the confusion prevalent outside of Kentucky, see D. LoUImSLL
& G. HAZARD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND PROCEDuRE 766-72 (3d ed. 1973);
Developments in the Law: Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARV.
L. REV. 983, 1080-1100 (1963).
51 566 S.W.2d 759 (Ky. App. 1978).
52 See Business Realty, Inc. v. Noah's Dove Lodge #20, 375 S.W.2d 389 (Ky. 1964);
Diamond Block Coal Co. v. UMW, 222 S.W. 1079, 1085 (Ky. 1920). Cf. CR 4.04 which
provides for service on unincorporated associations, but does not deal with the capacity
of an association to sue or be sued.
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the association itself can be made a party. The association is
deemed to have "sufficient legal entity" [sici to be sued in
this fashion. 3
Unfortunately, the court did not proceed to explain the
rationale or implications of the "curious development" on
which it relied, thereby leaving the law in a state of considera-
ble uncertainty. Use of the class action against unincorporated
associations in Kentucky is not a firmly established procedural
device,54 especially in the absence of legislation permitting suit
against the organization as an entity.55 Nevertheless, historical
and contemporary precedent allow the use of the class suit in
such cases,5" and it seems clear that in most cases such litiga-
566 S.W.2d at 761.
' Though both of the cases the court cites for the "rather curious development"
in Kentucky law, Lyons v. Bryan, 273 S.W.2d 838 (Ky. 1954), and Local Union No.
500 of Brotherhood of Painter's, Decorators & Paper Hangers of America v. Wise, 269
S.W.2d 721 (Ky. 1954), contain language which supports the proposition that an asso-
ciation may be amenable to suit through the class action device, neither case explains
the rationale for this development. Instead, both cases rely exclusively on Jackson v.
International Union of Operating Eng., 211 S.W.2d 138 (Ky. 1948), in which the Court
allowed a union to be sued by means of a class action. However, none of the grounds
relied upon by the Jackson Court provides a firm foundation for the "rather curious
development," much less justifies its extension to a case like American Collectors.
First, the Jackson Court relied on the predecessor to CR 23.01 and 23.02, Section
25 of the Civil Practice Act. This procedural rule did not authorize a suit against an
unincorporated association, as the Jackson Court noted. 211 S.W.2d at 146. Second,
Jackson relied on American Railway Express Co. v. Asher, 291 S.W. 21 (Ky. 1927). The
Asher Court found in § 208 of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS § 446.010 authoriza-
tion for allowing a suit to be maintained against a joint stock company, and possibly
an unincorporated association. However, the statutory and constitutional provisions
merely define the term "corporation" as it is used elsewhere in the Constitution or
statutes. They hardly seem to authorize suit against an association in its common
name or through a class action. If they do authorize such an action, then it is indeed
"curious" that the action may be maintained only by means of a class action. Finally,
Jackson relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in UMW v. Coronado
Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922), that a union could maintain an action in its common
name for the purpose of enforcing a substantive right existing under the Constitution
or laws of the United States. While the Jackson Court may have been able to imply a
right to sue an association by means of a class action from the fact that a union was
involved, the Jackson opinion did not expressly rely on a federal statute. In any event,
no federal statute was available in American Collectors. Indeed, had the Court of
Appeals in American Collectors carefully analyzed this supposed development in the
law, it would have realized that there has been little development in the law in this
area which was applicable to American Collectors.
5 See CLAY, KENTUCKY PRACTICE, Civil Rule 4.04 (1974 ed.).
56 E.g., West v. Randall, 29 Fed. Cas. 718, 722 (C.C.D.R.I. 1820) (Story, J.);
Developments, supra note 50, at 1084-87.
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tion will fit comfortably within the requirements of CR 23.02(a)
or (b).17
More difficult to explain is the court's holding that the
association itself can be treated as a member of the class. In
an action where the association was a plaintiff, or was defend-
ing against a claim for equitable relief, little more than concep-
tual difficulty would result from binding the association as a
party. Substantial additional difficulty arises in a suit for dam-
ages, such as American Collectors. The court seemed to recog-
nize this difficulty by rejecting American Collectors' attempt
to join the Committee in its own name. The court applied the
common-law procedural rule based on the principle that
"[t]here are no assets of the association as such (since there
is no association 'as such') . . . ,,"1 Thus, no real interest is
furthered by joinder of this "sufficient legal entity."
Even if the joinder of the unincorporated association in the
class suit is a charade, designed to sneak it in without a ticket
in the midst of a crowd, some rather perplexing issues remain
to be confronted. For example, what showing must be made
against the individual members in order to reach the associa-
tion's assets? If execution against the association is insuffi-
cient, are individual members liable for the excess? If they are,
are they liable apart from their interest in the common funds?
These are certainly not problems which the Court of Appeals
created; such problematic consequences result from any piece-
meal, case-by-case solutions to the procedural quandry left us
by the common law. The obvious, desirable, and much overdue
solution is a statutory provision giving such associations entity
status, permitting them to sue and be sued as corporations.
C. Intervention
In Schlaak v. Pearman,59 plaintiffs sought to compel a city
and a planning commission to rezone property on which they
desired to construct apartments. The city council had declined
to rezone after conductitig a trial type hearing. Nevertheless,
on the basis of the record made at the hearing before the city
' See also FED. R. Civ. P. 23.2.
LOUISELL & HAZARD, supra note 50, at 779.
, No. CA-502-MR (Ky. App. Sept. 23, 1977).
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council, the circuit court directed the rezoning. Nine days after
the judgment was entered and the city council had decided not
to appeal, several homeowners, including one Bennett, moved
to intervene for the purpose of instituting an appeal, basing
their motion on CR 24.01, which permits a person to intervene
as a matter of right upon timely application when the person
claims an interest in the subject matter of the litigation and is
so situated that the litigation may impair his ability to protect
that interest.
The Court of Appeals rejected all three reasons given by
the trial court for denying the motion to intervene." The court
held that the homeowners satisfied the interest requirements
of CR 24.01,61 that the motion was timely, and that the home-
owners' interests were not adequately represented by the City.
With regard to the timeliness of the motion, the court noted
that it was made at a time when the judgment could have been
modified or set aside . 2 Because the intervenor would be re-
stricted to the record in the case as it existed at the filing of
the motion, the plaintiffs would not be prejudiced by Bennett,
instead of the city, prosecuting the appeal. Consequently, the
court found that the application was timely, even though it was
filed nine days after judgment.
Courts have generally required a strong showing of timeli-
ness by potential intervenors after judgment." The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has cited two
" The three reasons the circuit court gave for denying the homeowners' motion
to intervene were: (1) the homeowners were not proper parties; (2) the motion was not
timely; and (3) the interests of the homeowners were adequately represented by the
city's defense. Id. at 2-3.
,1 Bennett clearly had an economic interest in maintaining the R-2 zoning for the
plaintiff's property since he lived within 100 feet of the property and claimed that a
flooding problem would be aggravated by the construction of the apartments. Though
the court never stated that Bennett's ability to protect his interest would be impaired,
it did indicate its agreement with the reasoning of Dillon Companies, Inc. v. City of
Boulder, 515 P.2d 627 (Colo. 1973). The Colorado court under similar circumstances
had found that the ability of landowners, living within one to one and one half blocks
of property involved in the rezoning dispute, to protect their interests would be im-
paired.
62 CR 59.02 and 59.05 allow ten days after the entry of judgment for a motion for
a new trial or a motion to alter or amend or vacate a judgment to be served. Bennett
sought to intervene nine days after judgment was entered.
11 Monticello Elec. Plant Bd. v. Board of Ed. of Wayne County, 310 S.W.2d 272
(Ky. 1958). See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 33, at § 1916.
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reasons for imposing this special burden on post-judgment ap-
plicants: (1) a fear the rights of the existing parties will be
prejudiced, and (2) a concern that the orderly processes of the
courts will be disturbed." But if neither of these results would
occur, then the mere fact that judgment has been entered
should not by itself require denial of a motion to intervene.' 5
Though the Kentucky Court of Appeals did not articulate these
concerns, its decision is consistent with the Fifth Circuit analy-
sis. The restricted nature of the record means that the only
"prejudice" suffered by the plaintiffs is the duty to defend an
appeal which would not otherwise have been taken. No compli-
cation of issues and parties, such as ordinarily accompanies
intervention at the trial stage, results from substitution of par-
ties on appeal. Moreover, the promptness with which Bennett
filed his motion after judgment meant that the appellees would
not face the burden of refamiliarizing themselves with a stale
record." The same considerations indicate that little marginal
cost is imposed on the judicial process. Intervention for pur-
poses of taking an appeal will not impose on the circuit or
appellate court the task of reconsidering issues already de-
cided; nor, if done with promptness, will it even require the
relaxation of the time requirements for notice of appeal and for
motions for reconsideration in the trial court.
The Court of Appeals did not expressly hold that the repre-
sentation of Bennett's interests by the city and the planning
commission was inadequate, although such a conclusion is a
necessary prerequisite to permitting intervention.67 Although
" McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1970).
" WIGHT & MLER, supra note 33, at § 1916.
11 There is also a possibility that prejudice to the city and planning commission
should be considered in ruling on the motion to intervene. Had the homeowners inter-
vened before trial, they could have perhaps assumed some of the burden of defending
the action. Should the fact that they instead chose to take a "free ride" preclude their
intervention after trial? See McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065 n.7 (5th Cir.
1970). The nature of the parties indicates that preclusion should not occur. The role
played by public entities in zoning determinations is the protection of members of the
public other than those seeking the change; in that sense the homeowners' ride was
not free-since they presumably paid taxes-and was one to which they were entitled
as citizens. See also United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 394-95 & n.16
(1977).
17 CR 24.01 provides that a party with a sufficient interest can intervene upon
timely motion, "unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing
parties." Thus, in order to allow Bennett to intervene as a matter of right, the Court
of Appeals had to find that his interests were not already adequately represented.
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intervention after judgment is generally disapproved,68 the
United States Supreme Court has recently recognized the per-
missibility of the practice where it is necessary to bring an
appeal from the denial of class action status. 69 The same con-
siderations are implicated in Schlaak which, although not a
class suit, is a representative action in the sense that the city
represents the views of concerned citizens like Bennett.
70
This approach might at first blush seem inconsistent with
an earlier Kentucky case, Murphy v. Lexington-Fayette
County Airport Board,1 in which the Court interpreted CR
24.01 as follows:
We do not conceive that CR 24.01 intends that if a party who
is representing the interests of a nonparty adequately repre-
sents those interests, but judgment nevertheless goes against
those interests, the party must appeal else the nonparty may
intervene as a matter of right. If that were the rule, a non-
party could simply lie back and await the result of the action
in the circuit court and then, if not satisfied with the judg-
ment, compel a retrial by the device of intervening after judg-
ment."
Schlaak distinguished Murphy on the ground that in
Murphy the applicant had not participated in the trial of the
case, whereas the homeowners in Schlaak had taken part in the
trial-type hearing before the city council, the only evidentiary
hearing conducted in the case.7 3 Certainly, this alleviates the
concern of the Murphy court that the intervenor would "lie
back."74 Yet, the activity of the applicant-though it may be
relevant to the issue of timeliness-has nothing to do with the
adequacy of representation. A sounder basis for distinguishing
the cases is suggested in the Murphy opinion itself and noted
68 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 33, at § 1916.
United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977).
70 See also Wolpe v. Poretsky, 144 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir. 1944), where the court
permitted adjoining property owners to intervene after judgment for purposes of ap-
peal. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals found that the planning commission
did not adequately represent the intervenors' interest when it refused to appeal.
71 472 S.W.2d 688 (Ky. 1971).
72 Id. at 690.
1 Pursuant to City of Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1971), the
circuit court was confined to the record made at the hearing before the city council.
71 See note 66 supra for a discussion of this point.
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above: the city in Schlaak legally represented the homeowners,
so that the judgment would bind the nonparties, while in
Murphy the intervenor was not "represented" by a party "in
the sense employed in the doctrine of res judicata. '75
D. Use of Excess Peremptory Challenges
In Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. Cook,76 the
Court of Appeals considered whether the erroneous granting of
excess peremptory challenges in a civil trial constitutes reversi-
ble error. 77 The plaintiff had instituted a declaratory judgment
action against several defendants to determine the existence
and extent of insurance coverage for claims arising out of a
traffic accident involving some of the defendants. The circuit
court granted the defendants additional peremptory challenges
because of their positions as opponents in a related tort action.
On appeal, the court agreed with the plaintiff that the circuit
judge had erred in granting the additional challenges, since all
the defendants had taken identical positions in the declaratory
judgment action. 78
Nevertheless, the error did not require reversal, since it did
not affect the "substantial rights" of the plaintiff, as required
by CR 61.02. 71 The court reasoned that although some qualified
jurors were improperly rejected due to the excess challenges,
they were replaced by equally qualified jurors. As long as the
plaintiff had received a fair trial before an impartial jury, the
court saw no reason to reverse. If any of the jurors who had
" 472 S.W.2d at 690.
7, No. CA-1505-MR (Ky. App. June 30, 1978).
Prior to repeal, KRS § 29.290 (1972) had provided "each party litigant" with
three peremptory challenges, in addition to challenges for cause. KRS § 29A.290(2)(b)
(Supp. 1978) now empowers the Supreme Court to prescribe the number of peremptory
challenges.
Is Multiple plaintiffs and defendants are entitled to additional peremptory chal-
lenges only if their interests are antagonistic. Roberts v. Taylor, 339 S.W.2d 653 (Ky.
1960). It is error to grant additional peremptory challenges in the absence of a showing
of antagonism between the parties' trial positions. R. E. Gaddie, Inc. v. Evans, 394
S.W.2d 118 (Ky. 1965); Pendly v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 92 S.W. 1 (Ky. 1906).
" CR 61.02 states:
A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party may be
considered by the court on motion for a new trial or by an appellate court
on appeal, even though insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and
appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination that manifest injus-
tice has resulted from the error.
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replaced the improperly rejected jurors were not impartial,
then the plaintiff could have challenged them for cause.
Several jurisdictions have held that the exercise of excess
peremptory challenges constitutes reversible error, regardless
of the demonstrability of prejudice. 0 The majority rule, how-
ever, seems to be that the exercise of excess peremptory chal-
lenges constitutes reversible error only if the complaining party
shows prejudice."1
In support of its decision, the court cited two cases82 which
have been interpreted as supporting the majority view,s indi-
cating that the court may. allow reversal upon a showing of
prejudice by complaining parties. However, the court's opinion
hinted that a party would not be able to show prejudice except
by proving sufficient bias on the part of a juror to sustain a
challenge for cause. Because the right protected in Kentucky
Farm Bureau is a party's right to a trial before a fair and
impartial jury, reversal will not occur unless a biased juror is
empaneled due to the exercise of excess peremptory challenges.
Since the court indicates that this bias must be of the nature
which would support a challenge for cause," the peremptory
challenge issue is meaningless. Therefore, under the view ap-
parently adopted by the court, any error resulting from the
exercise of excess peremptory challenges is either harmless or
unimportant.85
See ANNOT., 95 A.L.R.2d 957, 971-75 (1964).
, Id. at 963-70.
Fick v. Wolfinger, 198 N.W.2d 146 (Minn. 1972); Stevens v. Union R.R., 58 A.
492 (R.I. 1904).
" ANNOT., supra note 80, at 964.
" It is conceivable that the courts could find reversible error if excess peremptory
challenges resulted in the empanelling of a juror who was biased to some degree, but
not sufficiently prejudiced to have justified the grant of a challenge for cause. See
Smith v. El Paso & N. E. Ry. Co., 67 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); and Rutland
v. St. Louis, S.F. & T. Ry. Co., 274 S.W. 284 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925), aff'd on other
grounds, 292 S.W. 182 (Tex. Com. App. 1927). The distinction is an elusive one, and
in any event would require exhaustion of the complaining party's peremptory chal-
lenges as a prerequisite. The failure of the Court of Appeals to allude to exhaustion
by Kentucky Farm Bureau, as well as its reference to the possibility of challenge for
cause as a cure for prejudice, indicate that it had no such distinction in mind.
One interesting issue which the case leaves open is whether an erroneous grant
of excess peremptory challenges would justify reversal if such challenges were em-
ployed to carry out a party's plan to exclude all jurors of a certain racial or religious
group. The general rule, stated in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), is that a
party may constitutionally use all of his peremptory strikes to eliminate all jurors who
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V. JUDGMENTS
A. Default Judgments
In Roadrunner Mining, Engineering & Development Com-
pany, Inc. v. Bank Josephine,6 the plaintiff brought a foreclo-
sure action on five promissory notes totalling approximately
$340,000. The plaintiff amended its complaint twice, decreas-
ing the amount sought by nearly $70,000. The first amended
complaint explained that one of the notes had been satisfied
through the sale of secured property. However, an increase of
almost $1750 claimed on the other four notes was left unex-
plained. 7 The plaintiff did not obtain leave of court or the
defendants' consent to file the second amended complaint,
which corrected errors in the designation of personal property
upon which plaintiff had a lien to secure the notes. After the
plaintiff secured a default judgment on the basis of the second
amended complaint, the defendants moved to have the judg-
ment set aside. The circuit court denied the motion. The Court
of Appeals and the Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting defen-
dants' arguments that the default judgment was void.88
are members of the opposing party's group. But there is at least some tension between
that rule and the requirement that the right to a fair trial includes the right to a trial
before a representative cross-section of the community. A California court recently
held that use of a party's allotment of peremptory challenges in situations of "group
bias" violates the cross-section requirement of the state's constitution. People v.
Wheeler, 47 U.S.L.W. 2264, 2265 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Sept. 25, 1978). A grant of excess
peremptory challenges used to further such systematic exclusion gives the appearance
of judicial participation in a discriminatory scheme. In addition, the beneficiary of an
erroneous grant of extra challenges has, as a matter of statutory definition, no need of
extra peremptories to satisfy his right to a fair panel. Therefore, reversal should be
required if the complaining party can establish that the challenges were made because
of group association rather than because of any specific juror bias.
U 548 S.W.2d 153 (Ky. App.), aff'd, 558 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. 1977).
"The Court summarized the amounts demanded by the complaints as follows:
Complaint Amended Complaint Difference
$148,197.76 $148,482.76 $ 285.00
34,827.15 35,740.75 913.60
46,618.52 46,903.52 285.00
69,838.63 none (69,838.63)
40,490.86 40,750.86 260.00
Totals $127,877.89 $(68,095.03)
558 S.W.2d at 598.
n "CR 55.02 authorizes the trial court to set aside a default judgment for 'good
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First, the defendants argued the judgment was void since
it had been granted on the basis of an unauthorized com-
plaint. 9 The Court agreed that the second amended complaint
was technically unauthorized, due to the plaintiff's failure to
obtain leave of court or consent of the defendants before filing
the amended complaint." However, the Court held that enter-
ing judgment pursuant to the complaint constituted "leave of
court." Though the reasoning of the Court seems to beg the
question," the result is surely correct in light of the liberality
with which a court should grant leave to amend.12
Second, the defendants argued that the amended com-
plaints asserted "new or additional claims for relief" and that
no new summons was issued as required by CR 5.01. 91 Accord-
ing to that rule, parties in default for failure to appear must
be given notice by summons of pleadings asserting new or addi-
tional claims for relief against them. 4 The rule is designed to
ensure that a non-appearing defendant will not be held liable
after default for a claim or amount of damages different from
that set forth in the pleading he decided not to contest."
cause shown . . . in accordance with Rule 60.02.' Among the grounds enumerated in
CR 60.02 the only one applicable in this instance would be that the judgment was
void." Id. at 598.
" CR 15.01 allows a party to amend its pleading once as a matter of course at any
time before a responsive pleading is served. It further provides that a party may
otherwise amend only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party.
" The defendant was already in default before the plaintiff amended the com-
plaint. It could be argued that no leave of court should be required when the party is
in default for failure to appear. However, the Court correctly noted that CR 15.01 "does
not expressly allow for such an exception." 558 S.W.2d at 598.
" The question was whether a judgment is void when based on an unauthorized
complaint. The Court reasoned that the complaint was authorized by the judgment,
despite the apparent problems inherent in permitting a judgment which is arguably
void to constitute leave of court.
92 CR 15.01 states: "[L]eave shall be freely given when justice so requires."
'3 CR 15.01 provides, in part: "Parties. . .in default [for failure to appear] shall
be given notice of pleadings asserting new or additional claims for relief against them
by summons or warning order issued thereon as provided in Rule 4."
" See 2 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTIcE 5.05 (2d ed. 1976).
" See Adamsen Constr. Co. v. Altendorf, 152 N.W.2d 576 (N.D. 1967), where the
court writes:
The courts generally seem to hold that a defendant has the right to allow
a default to be taken against him for an amount specifically demanded by
the plaintiff in the complaint. Where the defendant allows such default
judgment to be entered, he should not be required to follow the proceedings
further to make sure that the judgment actually entered against him does
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As the Court recognized, a default judgment generally can-
not be granted for an amount greater than that claimed in a
pleading to which the defaulting party had an opportunity to
respond." Indeed, in such a case a defendant might not have
defaulted had the complaint with which he was served con-
tained the claim for greater damages. However, Roadrunner
Mining was an "unusual case, 9 7 in that the total amount
claimed was substantially lessened by the amended com-
plaints. Undoubtedly, a decrease should not constitute a
"new" claim for relief, since a defendant who had determined
not to appear would not change his mind due to reduction in
the amount sought.
Yet in Roadrunner Mining the large reduction in one note,
which resulted in a lower net sum, was accompanied by in-
creases in the other four notes. Under some circumstances,
such increases would have constituted additional claims for
relief, requiring the issuance of a new summons. For example,
in a case like Roadrunner Mining a defendant might be willing
to default on a note which could be satisfied out of secured
property while contesting smaller increases on other unsecured
notes which would jeopardize its liquid assets. Such a defen-
dant must have notice of the amendment so that it can deter-
mine whether to appear and defend.
Nevertheless, the Court held that, on the facts before it,
the $1750 increase did not constitute an additional claim for
relief. The defendants conceded during oral argument that the
increase represented recoverable costs incurred by the plaintiff
in selling the secured property. That the plaintiff chose to
spread the costs over the other four notes, instead of indicating
the costs still due on the omitted note, was "more a matter of
bookkeeping than legal substance.""8
not exceed the amount prayed for in the complaint. In such case, the defen-
dant should be safe in assuming the judgment will be entered for only the
amount demanded in the complaint.
Id. at 581.
Id.
" 558 S.W.2d at 599.
, Id. The Court's disposition of the CR 5.01 claim forecloses a third technical
point which the defendants may have relied upon. CR 15.01 provides that a party
"shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the time remaining for re-
sponse to the original pleading or within 10 days after service of the amended pleading,
whichever period may be longer, unless the court otherwise orders." Since the amended
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B. Summary Judgment
CR 56.03 requires that any party moving for summary
judgment must serve its motion at least ten days prior to the
time fixed for the hearing on the motion.9 Most other motions
need only be served "a reasonable time before the time speci-
fied for the hearing." ' This difference in treatment indicates
that the rulemakers attached special importance to adequate
preparation for summary judgment hearings. This concern is
obviously well-founded, since a summary judgment disposes of
the merits and purports to have a conclusive effect on the liti-
gation. Also, it is often a difficult task to put together legal and
factual arguments, as well as affidavits, in opposition to a mo-
tion for summary judgment.''
Although CR 56.03 expressly provides that a motion for
summary judgment may be made by any party, it does not
address the circumstances under which a party who has not
filed such a motion may be entitled to summary judgment.' 2
Generally, a court may enter summary judgment on its own
motion against a movant for summary judgment and in favor
of a non-moving party.'03 In light of the policy behind the notice
pleadings were not served on the defendants, an exact reading of CR 15.01 would
require no answer and invalidate a default judgment based on either of the amended
complaints.
The correct response to such a claim would be that CR 5.01 excuses service on any
party "in default for failure to appear," thus rendering an answer to an amended
complaint, which did not assert a new or additional claim for relief, superfluous. The
crucial fact, which renders inoperative the portion of CR 15.01 quoted above, is the
entry of the default judgment based on the bank's original complaint.
,1 CR 56.03.
MI CR 6.04. In federal court such motions only have to be served five days prior
to the time specified for the hearing. FED. R. Civ. P. 6(d).
,0, See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 33, at § 2719.
,12 CR 56.03 refers to the motions authorized in CR 56.01 and CR 56.02, which deal
only with motions by parties.
,03 See generally, WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 33, § 2720 n.95; ANNOT., 49
A.L.R.2d 1188, 1191 (1956). Some states have provisions in their summary judgment
rules which allow the court to grant summary judgment without waiting for a cross-
motion. E.g., MD. R. Civ. P. 610(d). However, a few cases support the proposition that
under Rule 56 a court, upon motion by one party for summary judgment, has no power
to grant a judgment against the moving party and in favor of the non-moving party.
See Pinkus v. Reilley, 71 F. Supp. 993 (N.J. 1947), aff'd on other grounds, 170 F.2d
786 (3d Cir. 1948), affl'd, 338 U.S. 269 (1949); Durham v. I.C.T. Inc. Co., 283 S.W.2d
413 (Tex. Ct. App. 1955).
A distinction should perhaps be drawn between a court granting summary judg-
ment sua sponte and a court granting summary judgment against a moving party in
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requirement of CR 56.03, then, must a court acting on its own
authority give the movant ten days' notice before entering sum-
mary judgment against him? The Kentucky Court of Appeals
addressed this question in Hay v. Hayes.'0
A transferor of land brought an action to have the transfer
construed as either a constructive trust or a mortgage. He
moved for summary judgment on the sole theory that a deposi-
tion of the defendants contained a judicial admission that the
transfer was a mortgage. The defendants did not make a cross-
motion for summary judgment. Nevertheless, the circuit court
denied the plaintiff's motion and granted the defendants sum-
mary judgment on its own motion without notice to the plain-
tiff. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that
the circuit court was required to give ten days' notice to the
plaintiff.
In reaching its conclusion, the court distinguished an ear-
lier Kentucky case which held that the trial court was not
required to give notice. In Collins v. Duff'f the sole issue was
whether a decedent was a resident of Fayette or Perry County.
The Court of Appeals, then Kentucky's highest judicial tri-
bunal, affirmed summary judgment granted by the trial court
to the nonmoving party, reasoning that a cross-motion would
have been a "useless formality" since the overruling of the
defendant's motion necessarily required a determination that
the plaintiff was entitled to judgment.'8 Such clearly was not
favor of the opposing/nonmoving party. In the latter case, the court is already consider-
ing whether there is any genuine issue of material fact, whereas in the former the court
acts as the original initiator of the motion. This distinction has provoked some criti-
cism of sua sponte summary judgments. E.g., Choudhry v. Jenkins, 559 F.2d 1089 (7th
Cir. 1977); 6 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 56.12 (2d ed. 1976). However there seems to
be little reason for concern about abuse of sua sponte summary judgments as long as
the trial court gives the opposing party an adequate opportunity to counter the asser-
tion that there is no genuine issue of material fact. See WmIrr & MILLER, supra note
33, at 2719.
U 564 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. App. 1978).
'' 283 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. 1955).
,uId. at 183. Other courts have also stated the rule in a manner which would allow
the court to grant summary judgment to a nonmoving party in a limited number of
cases without giving the moving party ten days' notice. E.g., Purser v. Corpus Christi
State Nat'l Bank, 552 S.W.2d 187 (Ark. 1975). See also Herzog & Straus v. GRT Corp.,
553 F.2d 789, 793 (2d Cir. 1977) (Timbers, J., concurring specially). But compare
Adams v. Campbell Cty. School Dist., 483 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1973); Mustang Fuel
Corp. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 480 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1973).
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the case in Hay: a finding that defendant's deposition did not
contain a judicial admission in favor of the plaintiff was not
dispositive of the case, since there were many other issues of
fact yet to be decided.1"7 The Court of Appeals in Hay limited
Collins to the situation where the "determination of the sole
issue necessarily requires a finding for one of the parties."1' In
all other cases, the court must give the party ten days' notice
prior to entering summary judgment against him.
This general rule is consistent with the view espoused by
other jurisdictions which have considered the question."° It
also promotes the policy underlying the ten-day requirement of
CR 56.03-assuaging the difficulty of preparing for summary
judgment hearings in light of the crucial nature of the hearing.
This policy applies equally whether the judge renders summary
judgment with or without a request by a party. Since the
Collins exception indicates that this policy can be overridden
in certain circumstances, it is important to examine the precise
scope of that exception.
It is clear from Hay that the Collins exception is applicable
only in the rarest of cases. The mere fact that a party's motion
for summary judgment is denied does not entitle the opposing
party to judgment. A denial of a summary judgment motion is
simply an indication that the movant has failed to show that
there is no genuine issue of material fact. It does not imply that
the opposing party has shown that he is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Thus, from a purely logical perspective,
denial of summary judgment to a movant never "necessarily
requires" a grant of summary judgment to a non-movant. Yet
Collins mandates a more practical application of the
"necessarily requires" standard. Perhaps the standard merely
ensures that summary judgment will be granted without notice
I°7 For example, the question as to whether the transfer might be considered a
constructive trust had apparently not even'been addressed.
"1S 564 S.W.2d at 225.
'0 E.g., Winfrey v. Brewer, 570 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1978); Dolese v. United States,
541 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1976); Adams v. Campbell County School Dist., 483 F.2d 1351
(10th Cir. 1973); Purser v. Coipus Christi State Nat'l Bank, 522 S.W.2d 187 (Ark.
1975). See also Kistner v. Califano, 579 F.2d 1004, 1006 (6th Cir. 1978).
Though none of these courts places reliance on Rule 54, it does seem to be relevant:
"[E]very final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is
rendered is entitled even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings."
CR 54.03.
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only when the issue is framed as an 'either-or' question, as in
Collins.
Another aspect of Collins which may have an impact on
the applicability of the exception is that the judge in Collins
was also the trier of fact. It seems reasonable to grant a judge
greater latitude in a nonjury case to dispose of the case where
it is clear that no significant additional evidence will be offered
by the parties. In a jury trial the judge should exercise greater
caution in taking the case from the trier of fact by means of
summary judgment.
C. Findings of Fact
In Quality Paving Co. v. Musselman,°10 the Court held that
any error committed by a trial court in failing to make findings
of fact as required by CR 52.01 was not preserved for review
because the appellant had made neither a written request for
a finding as provided by CR 52.04111 nor a motion for additional
findings as provided by CR 52.02.112 Originally, CR 52.01 con-
tained the unqualified statement that "[r]equests for findings
are not necessary for purposes of review." It thereby secured
appellate review for all questions concerning the trial court's
findings of fact. In 1973, amendments to CR 52, unparalleled
in the Federal Rules, were adopted which completely reversed
the law on the preservation for review of errors made by the
trial court in its findings of fact.
CR 52.01 now states: "Requests for findings are not neces-
sary for purposes of review except as provided in Rule 52.04. "13
The entirely new section, CR 52.04, makes it clear that the
" No. 76-448 (Ky. Nov. 18, 1977).
' CR 52.01 states, in part:
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury,
the court shall find the facts specifically and state separately its conclusions
of law thereon and render an appropriate judgment.. . . Requests for find-
ings are not necessary for purposes of review except as provided in Rule 52.04
(emphasis added).
1 CR 52.02 states:
Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court of its own
initiative, or on the motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry
of judgment, may amend its findings or make additional findings and may
amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion
for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59.
"I CR 52.01 (emphasis added).
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failure of the trial court to make a finding of fact on an issue
essential to the judgment will not constitute reversible error
unless the complaining party has brought it to the attention of
the trial court. The complaining party may accomplish this in
two ways: (1) by a written request for a finding on that issue
as provided in CR 52.04, or (2) by a motion for additional
findings pursuant to CR 52.02.
The reason for the amendments to CR 52 may be to align
the rule with CR 51, which requires that objections to jury
instructions be brought to the trial court's attention.' Both
rules now contribute to more effective trial administration by
giving the trial judge an opportunity to correct a mistake and
thereby obviate the need for an appeal."5 In addition, CR 51 is
designed to eliminate the use of general objections to the giving
of or failure to give an instruction."6 It is unclear whether this
policy carries over to Rule 52 objections to findings of fact.
CR 51 requires that a party state the specific decision re-
garding instructions to which he objects as well as the grounds
for the objection. The language of CR 52 suggests that a request
for a finding on an issue must be specific, and while the rule
does not expressly require that a motion for additional findings
be specific, the nature of the motion makes it extremely likely
to focus on particular elements of the judge's findings. How-
ever, the rules do not require a statement of the grounds (basis
in the presented evidence) for the requested findings."7 This
departure from the practice regarding jury instructions is ex-
plained to some extent by the fact that CR 52 deals with find-
ings of fact and CR 51 with points of law. The judge is more
likely to know already the evidentiary basis for a finding of fact
than to know the legal basis for accepting, rejecting, or modify-
ing a jury instruction. However, this distinction seems artificial
in many instances, since it fails to recognize the effect on a
judge's memory of a substantial time lapse"' and because it is
I' CR 51 (3).
I's See generally, CLAY, 7 KENTUCKY PRACTICE, 147-48 (3d ed. 1974); WRIGHT &
MIlLER, supra note 33, at § 2553.
"I E.g., City of Dawson Springs v. Reddish, 344 S.W.2d 826 (Ky. 1961). See also
Investment Service Co. v. Allied Equities Corp., 519 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1975); WRIGHT
& MILLER, supra note 33, at § 2554.
117 The omission parallels the practice under CR 46, which requires a statement
of grounds for an exception to a ruling or order only upon request of the court.
I's For example, a judge's failure to make a finding concerning the defendant's
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based on the often hazy line between questions of law and
questions of fact."' Thus, at least to some extent, the amended
CR 52 does not operate to focus attention on the precise nature
of the alleged error, and thereby fails to implement fully the
sound policy reflected in CR 51.
D. Conclusiveness of Judgment
James and A. E. Lewis each owned interests in two tracts
of land. James Lewis leased to Brushy Creek Coal Company
the right to mine the coal on one of the tracts. All of the royalty
checks were paid to him, but he made no attempt to pay to his
co-owner the proportionate shares. In August, 1974, he brought
suit against A. E. Lewis and his wife, Virginia, to quiet title to
the land. James Lewis asserted that he had a "tax lien" on A.
E. Lewis' interest in the property because he alone had paid the
taxes on the land, and asked the court to foreclose the "lien"
on the property. The complaint was dismissed for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Subsequently, A. E. and Virginia Lewis brought suit
against James Lewis and several mining companies, including
Brushy Creek Coal, seeking an accounting for their proportion-
ate share of the profits from the sale of the coal. The mining
companies were also charged with willful trespass. The trial
court dismissed, reasoning that the allegations in the com-
plaint were defenses to the former action to quiet title and were
waived under CR 12 .02,110 since they were not asserted in that
action.
On appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court in Lewis v.
Brushy Creek Coal Co.'2 reversed the trial court's dismissal of
A. E. Lewis' complaint. The claim for willful trespass, the
Court held, could not have been raised as a defense in the
state of mind in an action for conversion could rest on his conclusion that good faith
was an insufficient defense as a matter of law, rather than on his perception of the
persuasiveness of the proof.
110 For example, a judge's recollection of the elements of proof in a protracted
construction case will often be far hazier than his memory of the rules regarding
indemnity.
'2 CR 12.02 states: "Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counter-claim, cross-claim, or third-party claim shall be
asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required ..
U" No. 74-329 (Ky. Oct. 7, 1977).
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initial action since the mining companies had not been parties
to the action.' 22 The claim for an accounting, the Court held,
would have been a permissive counterclaim, but not a defense,
in the action to quiet title, and consequently need not have
been asserted.
The trial court's application of CR 12.02 had been quite
perplexing. CR 12.02 requires every defense to a claim for relief
to be asserted in the responsive pleading. Its most obvious
effect is to codify the general rule of merger by precluding the
unsuccessful defendant from raising new defenses in an action
on the judgment brought by a victorious plaintiff. 23 It can also
be invoked by way of collateral estoppel against a losing defen-
dant whose subsequent suit upon a claim identical with the
omitted defense would, if successful, undermine the judgment
in the initial action. 2 However, the trial court employed CR
12.02 to preclude a claim brought by one who had been a win-
ning defendant in the first action. For even if the claim made
in the second action had been put forth defensively in the origi-
nal suit, the first court might still have decided the case on the
basis that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted and the defendant would have been
unable to appeal. Certainly in that situation the defendant
would not be precluded from later asserting the identical claim
as a plaintiff, for the obvious reasons that the issue was not
decided in the initial action, and that a later decision would
have no effect on the prior judgment. It makes little sense to
treat a victorious defendant who has omitted a defense differ-
ently.12
,22 Although not mentioned by the Court, the claim for trespass could not have
been considered a compulsory counterclaim. CR 13.01 provides that "[a] pleading
shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the
pleader has against any opposing party. .. "
123 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 47(b) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
1' Id. at § 56.1, Comment f. Illustration 9 following that Comment provides a clear
example:
9. A brings an action against B for failure to pay the contract price for goods
sold and delivered and recovers judgment by default. After entry of final
judgment and payment of the price, B brings an action against A to rescind
the contract for mutual mistake, seeking restitution of the contract price and
offering to return the goods. The action is precluded.
See also Powell v. Winchester Bank, 551 S.W.2d 820, 822 (Ky. 1977).
121 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 56.1, Comment b (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1973).
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What makes the trial court's decision in Brushy Creek
Coal even more perplexing is the fact that the claim for an
accounting was not, properly speaking, a defense to the earlier
action. Although the theory on which James Lewis-the plain-
tiff in that action-relied is somewhat obscure,"' it is at least
clear that he sought relief because he had paid all the taxes on
the land. It would be possible to grant him some remedy on
that claim while acknowledging that he had wrongfully appro-
priated royalties from the sale of coal which were due A. E. and
Virginia Lewis.
It is true that under James Lewis' view of the initial action,
both his claim and the defendant's right to an accounting de-
pended on who had title to the land. Even so the real problem
which the case presented was whether the right to an account-
ing had to be presented in the first action as a compulsory
counterclaim under CR 13.01 because it arose out of the same
"transaction or occurrence" as the plaintiffs claim. Failure to
do so, of course, would have precluded the later assertion of the
claim for an accounting.1
Drawing the distinction between permissive and compul-
sory counterclaims is often difficult. The "transaction or oc-
currence" test of CR 13.01 is broad and malleable. The most
widely accepted test for compulsoriness focuses on the exist-
ence of "any logical relationship" between the claim and the
counterclaim.1ss This test has been applied with a great deal of
flexibility and allows the court to apply Rule 13.01 with judicial
economy in mind. Arguably, there was a logical relationship
between the claim for an accounting and the claim to quiet
title, since both depended partially on whether A. E. Lewis had
an interest in the property. However, the overlap of one ele-
ment of proof ought not be determinative. While overlap may
suffice in a case where the counterclaim was actually pleaded
in the initial action, and the question was whether it should be
IU KRS § 411.120 (1972) requires that in an action to quiet title the plaintiff must
have both legal title and possession of the land. James Lewis' problem was that he
would not have been able to show legal title without first demonstrating that he had
secured his brother's and sister-in-law's interest through recognition and enforcement
of a lien, or adverse possession, a claim for which payment of taxes alone would not
suffice as proof.
it See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 33, at § 1417.
In No. 74-329 at 3.
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considered compulsory or permissive for purposes of jurisdic-
tion, venue, jury trial, right of removal, or appealability, the
courts have read the rule more narrowly where the harsh conse-
quence of preclusion will follow from the failure to raise the
issues in an earlier action. 129
The Court of Appeals also considered the question of the
conclusiveness of earlier adjudications in Norrell v. Electric &
Water Plant Board of Frankfort,"' another in a long series of
lawsuits concerning the Frankfort cable television system.'
The plaintiffs, competitors of the city's own CATV system,
objected to the'extension of city service into the eastern portion
of Frankfort, claiming that the Plant Board had no authority
to run a cable television system and, alternatively, seeking
compliance with the antiduplication of utilities provisions of
KRS § 96.045, which requires purchase or condemnation of an
existing utility when a city constructs a similar facility. The
circuit court found that both issues could have been presented
in earlier cases involving the same parties, and hence precluded
the plaintiffs from raising them. The Court of Appeals disa-
greed, though affirming as to the first claim on an alternative
ground.
Apparently, none of the earlier actions in state court had
involved the transaction which was the basis for the present
case. 132 Although a federal court suit involved precisely the
same factual controversy, the Sixth Circuit expressly abstained
from deciding any state law issues.33 Thus none of the issues
in Norrell could have been extinguished by the broad rules of
'2 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 33, at §§ 1410, 1417. See, e.g., Hay v. Hayes, 546
S.W.2d 224 (Ky. App. 1978). One interesting question left open by the Supreme
Court's opinion is whether the initial action to quiet title was dismissed on a motion
under CR 12.02(f) before the defendants had to file an answer. In that case the difficult
issue of how to classify the counter-claim would become irrelevant, since CR 13.01 is
inoperative before a responsive pleading is filed. See Lawhorn v. Atlantic Refining Co.,
299 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1962).
"' 557 S.W.2d 900 (Ky. App. 1977).
' 'See Consolidated Television Cable Serv., Inc. v. City of Frankfort, 465 F.2d
1190 (6th Cir. 1972); Norrell v. Judd, 387 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. 1965); Consolidated Television
Serv., Inc. v. Leary, 382 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. 1964); Norrell v. Judd, 374 S.W.2d 192 (Ky.
1963). See also Community Serv., Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 709 (6th Cir. 1969).
In See, Norrell v. Judd, 387 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. 1965); Consolidated Television Serv.,
Inc. v. Leary, 382 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. 1964); Norrell v. Judd, 374 S.W.2d 192 (Ky. 1963).
113 Consolidated Television Cable Serv., Inc. v. City of Frankfort, 465 F.2d 1190
(6th Cir. 1972).
[Vol. 67
KENTUCKY LAW SuRVEY
merger and bar. Therefore, the res judicata question was a
more refined one: whether the rules of issue preclusion pre-
vented the plaintiffs from asserting grounds for relief which
might have been asserted in connection with the claims earlier
presented.
The question of the duplication of utilities was not in-
volved in any of the previous actions. However, the question of
the city's legal authority to run a cable TV system might well
have been raised as a basis for relief in the earlier cases. Never-
theless, if any single principle lies at the heart of the doctrine
of issue preclusion, it is that a question must be actually liti-
gated and finally determined before it can provide the basis for
collateral estoppel.13
The Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion by a
more roundabout route. Though it quite properly described the
case as presenting a question of issue preclusion, it went on to
say that that rule:
is subject to the limitation that only those issues which are
germane to, implied in, or so essentially connected with the
actual issues in a previous case as to be involved in the scope
of the proceedings are precluded from being raised in a later
case between the parties .... 135
The requirement of "essential connection" is an apt, though
rather limited, description of the scope of claim preclusion,M
and while it operates a fortiori to preserve issues raised for the
first time in a subsequent action based on a different claim, it
is a rather blunt instrument for performing that function when
the requirement of actual litigation and determination will suf-
fice.
Though the court refused to hold that the doctrine of res
I" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
'' 557 S.W.2d at 902-03.
" Contrast the greater breadth endorsed by the Kentucky Supreme Court only
one month after the Norrell case, in Stephens v. Goodenough, 560 S.W.2d 556 (Ky.
1977):
This Court has long followed the rule that the doctrine of res judicata, except
in special cases, goes not only to points upon which the court was actually
required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce judgment, but to
every point which properly belonged to the subject litigation and which the
parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward.
560 S.W.2d at 558.
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judicata barred the plaintiffs' claims, it concluded that judicial
estoppel prevented the plaintiffs from asserting that the city
did not have legal authority to run a cable TV system. In the
hope of finding a more sympathetic ear in federal court on their
antiduplication claim, the plaintiffs had deleted that issue
from their state action and represented to the federal district
court that it was no longer an issue. Thereafter, upon losing the
federal antiduplication claim, the plaintiffs sought to reassert
the authority issue in state court. To permit that, the court
concluded, would be to allow Norrell and Consolidated to "play
fast and loose with the courts." 3'
' See also Scarano v. Central Ry. Co., 203 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1953); Rowe v.
Shepard, 283 S.W.2d 188 (Ky. 1955).
